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The paper offers a sociological explanation for the underground struc-
tures which arise in societies organized as political democracies. The
case of the United States is used to explore this curious fact. The dis-
junction between democracy in public life and inequality in private life
is resolved by the underground structures of the democratic state. In
brief, as a stratified society becomes more democratic, secret police
are used to destabilize social and collective movements toward equality.
The preferred strategy is to destabilize class enemies abroad and to
draw upon the profits of the global capitalist system in order to sus-
tain legitimacy at home without repression or deception. When this is
not possible, the crisis of capitalism requires the state to go under-
ground to control class enemies at home. Workers, socialists, women
and minority groups come under secret surveillance. Social justice is de-
feated while the appearance ofpopular governance is sustained.
In addition to the FBI, the CIA, the NSA, the Drug Enforcement
Agency' and the Secret Service, the U.S.' federal government has
eighteen other agencies which engage in surreptitious surveillance of
u.S. citizens. To these one must add the secret activities of the urban
police in the largest 300 or so American cities. And many states, led
perhaps by California, also have a secret state police capacity. Con-
temporary theory in American sociology on the state, on the whole
society, in deviance or in urban theory ignore this most interesting
and permanent part of the social order. In her otherwise excellent
analysis, Van fossen (1979) devotes one sentence to the role of secret
police in maintaining the stratification of power in the u.S. Roach,
Gross, and Gursslin don't mention police in their (1969) treatise on
'stratification in the u.s. nor does Merton (1968) mention the under-
ground structures of the state in his essays on Social Structure and
Anomie. One might wonder whether the FBI is rebellious or merely
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innovative when it spies on citizens without proper cause. Neither
Janowitz (1978) nor Lipset (1960) discuss the role of secret police in
the political process.
In contemporary sociological theory, secret police, surveillance,
and "destabilization of dissent movements" are seen to be the proper
domain of deviancy, abnormal psychology or they are taken for granted
in democratic societies. However, this pervasive social form is large,
expansive and a growth industry (Donner, 1981). A more sociological
way in which to understand the vast underground apparatus in place
in a democratic society is in terms of the functional needs of a social
formation which, by law, by rhetoric, and by organization is demo-
cratic in the public sphere and undemocratic in the private sphere.
The juxtaposition of two hostile governance systems create the need
for a linking apparatus by which the contradictions between democ-
racy in the public sphere and private authoritarian relations in shops,
factories, schools, universities, offices, and state bureaucracy can be
reconciled. In the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
other nations with formal democracy in the political sphere and with
bureaucracy or stratified relations in business, industry, education and
commerce, several irreconcilable conflicts arise. Underground struc-
tures of the state are used to reconcile these conflicts on behalf of
class, ethnic and elite privilege where the state operates within the
logics of capitalist, racist or bureaucratic systems such as the USSR. 1
It is not possible to insulate the spheres of authoritarian relations
from the political process in democratic societies. In authoritarian
political systems as, for example, Brazil, Chile, Korea, or the Philip-
pines, there is no contradiction between the. two sectors of society.
In democratic societies, the inequities in the private sphere come to
be registered in the political sphere by means of the electoral process
and by social movements outside the formal structure of politics. The
same is not true in those societies with authoritarian regimes. Indeed,
in many societies, the state is the open enemy of the oppressed min-
ority, the exploited worker or the hard-pressed consumer. El Salvador,
South Africa, Brazil, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Chile are
ready examples. In Guatemala, a death squad meets openly at a fav-
orite bar after its grisly work. There is little political need for under-
ground structures in a society in which class, racial or gender exploita-
tions are official objectives of the state apparatus. It is in the nations
where democracy has a handhold in the political sphere in which the
need for a secret, destabilizing capacity arises. The purpose of this
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paper is to offer a structural analysis of the rise of state espionage and
illegal state activity in these partial democracies.
The Rise of the Democratic State
The democratic state arises in European history as a device to
dismantle feudal relations on behalf of an emerging bourgeoisie. Having
~o~e its job, . the state is expected to maintain the conditions of cap-
italist expanslon, to moderate the harshest effects of market relations
and to p~otect national industry and commerce from outside capital.
The family and the church are to absorb the endemic alienation of
capitalist relations.
However, in the past hundred years, since at least the time of
Bismarck, the capitalist state has intruded ever more into the private
sphere. The state confronts the authoritarian relations in industry
agriculture, banking and the market place on behalf of workers, con-
sumers, and residents of polluted cities and towns as the principles of
collective organization are adopted by workers and others to moderate
the relentless press for profits in the private sphere. The logics of
political democracy are such that the state cannot insulate itself from
the real sufferings, outrages, abuses, and depredations of capital.
Dangerous working conditions, rising prices, falling real wages, unsafe
products, unusable water and unbreathable air all become the subject
of political discourse and the structure of capitalist production is
threatened as elected functionaries respond. If they do not, mass
politics moves away from them toward others who will respond under
the hope of political office.
As democratic processes continue to constrain private capital,
it becomes necessary, in order to preserve the system, for the state to
draw lines and to slow down the press for state remedy. As a conse-
quence of even limited democratic participation, real troubles arise
for private capital. Profits are lowered by laws making the workplace
safer. Profits are lowered by making products safer. Profits are lowered
by laws requiring purer air and water, Profits are lowered by paying
higher wages, by workers' compensation, by retirement and vacation
benefits and by taxation. Taxation is higher as the welfare function of
the state grows. The military capacity increases under the very real
threat to capital by other capitalist states, and by socialist and
nationalist liberation movements in the Third World where essential
minerals are found and essential markets are located. The state bears
the costs of policing the world while the capitalist class reaps the
profits. The state must take sides.
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Under these structural conditions it becomes necessary to limit
the intrusion of the state into the private sphere. Private capital must be
able to make investment, dividend, and automation decisions apart
from the objective interests of workers, consumers or citizens. Democ-
racy must be limited if capitalism is to survive. Programs of social
justice are sacrificed and political legitimacy declines. The question is
how to preserve capitalism and preserve the formal procedures of
democratic governance.
The State Goes Underground
The solution to the structural incompatibility between democ-
racy and capitalism is solved in the present epoch by the growth of
surreptitious state structures which direct their animus against selected
sectors of the population. The state functionaries establish secret police
agencies, one after another and give them a charter vague enough to
satisfy friendly scrutiny but focused well enough to signal directors
and agents as to whom they are to police.
Briefly, the state transforms into clientage organization. It serves
those clients who are established, serves well those clients with eco-
nomic power and drops those clients who are weak, unorganized or
who are isolated. Minority groups, women, the unemployed, children,
the sick, and the aged are dropped as state clients. The ill, the aged and
the young are difficult to organize as are the desperately poor. There
is little need for the state to watch and to harass these sectors of the
population. However, workers, Blacks, Indians, Chicanos, women, and
college students, anti-nuclear partisans and socialist groups can be
organized, can make demands on the state apparatus and must be
watched and destabilized if inequality is to be reproduced. Religious
groups against military action in Latin America and Africa must be
infiltrated and destabilized as well if access to raw materials and to
markets is to be guaranteed to the larger capitalist corporations. A
whole range of people, groups and movements become enemies of the
state.
However, there is nothing in the logic of democratic participation·
which permits the state to serve small business, banking, larger unions,
well-organized European ethnic groups, agriculture, and the trans-
national corporation while withholding clientage from other people
constitutionally and legally entitled to political participation and state
response. In order to survive, the state must maintain its legitimacy.
It does so by serving part of the population excellently well and by
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going underground in its disservice to those who would create new
demands upon the economy or upon the state.
A Brief History
In the early years of the United States, the repression of enemies
was open and practiced in both state and private sectors. After the
American Revolution, eight states banished loyalists and, together with
the Sons of Liberty, drove out thousands to Canada and South Ameri-
ca. 2 At the turn of the century, the Federalists controlled state power
and used it openly against the Jeffersonians. When the Jeffersonians
came to state power, they openly repressed Federalist supporters.
Again the state and private sector joined to punish its enemies. And in
the years of slavery, the state and private groups jointly oppressed
Blacks and abolitionists.
During the Civil War, Southern sympathizers were repressed by
state and private parties. The Bill of Rights was suspended by Lincoln
for the duration. In the reconstruction of the South, the victorious
North put the South under military rule and, as expected, under-
ground structures (the KKK) were organized by opponents of the state.
After 1872, in the South, the state apparatus was in the hands of
Southerners. The state and the KKK combined forces. Repression was
practiced without underground state structures.
Prior to the turn of this century, the crises of capitalism deepened
and workers began to organize. The state openly used the militia to
protect the interests of employers against workers. During World Wars
I and II, the state openly suppressed opponents of the wars and, with-
out cause, placed 20,000 or more Japanese-Americans in concentra-
tion ~~~ps during World War II. Until the post-war period of 1945-80,
the efforts at repression by the state apparatus were done more openly
than in secret. Since 1947, the American state has gone progressively
underground. The growth of the FBI and CIA has been phenomenal. 3
From 1955 to 1978, the FBI alone conducted 930,000 investigations
focused mainly on people who were not suspected of any given crime
(Donner, 1981 :127). The CIA is underground because its actions are
hostile to the interests of workers and minorities in the countries in
which it operates. The CIA has maintained large secret armies in large
secret wars against Cuba and Cambodia and, more recently, against
Nicaragua. Its present operations are secret and its warrant to expand
operations at home recently (October, 1981) enlarged.
The CIA and the other underground structures of the state in the
u.s. have grown large as Blacks, women, and anti-war, anti-nuclear
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forces gain popular support. The FBI and the various plumbers of the
Republican party went underground to destabilize these movements.
The sociological point is that as oppositional movements gain popu-
larity, the democratic state must go underground if it is to destabilize
them since, in law and in democratic theory, there is every right to
oppose. And these movements must be destabilized if capitalist rela-
tions are to be preserved. The state and its economic system cannot
meet the demands of both capitalists for funds to expand and minor-
ities for social justice (O'Connor, 1973).
Tactics of the Underground State
The tactics of the underground portion of the state apparatus are
well known. They include wiretapping, computerized interception of
microwave telephony, mail intercepts, infiltration of secret police
into left-wing groups, Black power groups, White power groups, Neo-
nazi groups, and women's liberation groups. Accurate, timely, relevant
information about their plans come to the hands of state functionaries.
As these groups are increasingly excluded from orthodox political
processes, they turn to unorthodox processes.
The techniques used by the FBI in its five Cointel programs
included fictitious letters attacking organizations through false, de-
famatory or threatening information; forging signatures, letterheads,
membership cards, disruption, false rumors, creating bogus organiza-
tions, labeling leaders as "snitches," using the media to attack groups
and individuals and obstructing the hiring of meeting places (Donner,
1981 :181-182).
~ .Ev.e.n_, if not illegal, these unorthodox activities can be used to
destabilize a movement before they can successfully add to the fiscal
crisis .. of private capital or to the legitimacy problems of the demo-
cratic state. Public sector workers can be fired for violating their oath,
teachers can be fired for not meeting their classes, nurses can be fired
for deserting the patient and students can be put on social probation
for disrupting classes.
Right-wing groups receive subtle signals that their private policing
of Black power advocates, teft-wing groups and religious movements
come under the benign eye of the sympathetic state functionary. Left-
wing groups are tarred with the KGB brush. Every effort is made in.
the private right-wing press to link these groups as well as militant
unions and Black activists to the Communist Party of the USSR via
the Communist Party of the USA. Similar efforts are made in Congress
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by sympathetic congresspersons who are convinced that only an evil
outside influence could lead otherwise good Americans astray."
On occasion, the democratic state will resort to violence against
those who mount effective opposition to the logics of capitalist
growth-especially in the Third World. The various efforts to assassi-
nate Castro by the CIA in Cuba and to eliminate opposition to friend-
ly regimes are examples (Powers, 1979). There is speculation among
Black activists that the FBI located Black Panther leaders and local
police SWAT teams killed them in several cities across the U. S. in the
late sixties and early seventies (Donner, 1981:226). And the record
of secret armed intervention in the third world has been slowly re-
vealed in the recent past. Chile, Cambodia, and Angola are well-known
cases as has been mentioned. There is, today (1983), an appropriations
bill before Congress to provide another 19 million dollars to support
the secret war in Nicaragua.
Again, the best explanation of this secret military capacity is
that the democratic state must oppose the transformation of market
relations to national or collective purposes on behalf of global capital
else it lose legitimacy at home. This threat to legitimacy is direct in
terms of loss of funding for political parties and indirect in terms of
the pressure from client groups including workers and middle-class
professionals whose prosperity is directly tied to the sale of American
goods on the world market and to the profits repatriated from Europe
and the Third World. There are 500 multinational corporations which
control the global capitalist system of which 300 are based in the u.S.
(Barnet and Muller, 1974).
The need for secrecy of action arises from the fact that, in a
democratic state, significant opposition to such venture would be
mounted were such policies ever debated in the public sphere. There is
tacit post hoc approval for secret programs mounted against class
enemies of the state (Powers, 1979). When presented with 'the accom-
plished fact, most people will accept even the dirtiest piece of work in
a sort of resigned realism. However, when such public discussion
occurs before the fact, all but the most determined political leader
would desist rather than suffer criticism should the venture fail. 5
The u.s. routinely uses the International Monetary Fund, AID
and the World Bank to destabilize class enemies abroad and to support
undemocratic regimes (Merip Report 69). The case of the Dominican
Republic is the latest such political, secret, and improper use of such
financial institutions. In violation of the charter and of public state-
ments, the financial power of these institutions is secretly deployed
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against socialist and nationalist liberation movements. Recently, the
official policy of the u.s. has changed regarding the political use of
food. Heretofore, such use was given a gloss of legitimacy. Now there
is no effort to mount a cover story. The fact that U.S. state func-
tionaries no longer feel a need to lie or dissemble is an ominous sign.
It signifies a move to the side of openly repressive regimes. Public
opinion at home and abroad maybe ignored-either it is expected that
opinion will be favorable or such states are past caring. It is ominous
in either case.
Crime and the Underground State
In another paper, I have set forth the ways in which the capitalist
market system stimulates crime (Young, 1978). And in order to control
the crimes against the capitalist corporations-bank robbery, swindling,
fencing, conversion, forgery and such-as well as crimes against middle-
class property and sobriety-auto theft, burglary, narcotics and fraud-
it is necessary to devote a large portion of the resources of the under-
~ound state to criminal activity. Crimes against workers-health
hazards, union busting, pension fund cheating, relocation of jobs to
Third World countries and any other criminal acts are not policed.
And crimes which divert and pacify the masses are loosely policed;
gambling, inner city drug use, prostitution and usury seldom see
virgorous police action of the sort levied against Black power, civil
rights, or anti-war and socialist groups. Crimes against minorities and
the lumpen proletariat are routinely discounted as proper targets for
underground state activity. The murders of the four civil rights workers
in Mississippi were a notable exception. There" the FBI used its secret
police capacity against a secret police capacity in the private sphere.
The system which gives rise to an ever increasing crime rate also
gives rise to an ever increasing underground apparatus. The boundaries
of crime and the effects of crime cannot be safely contained against
class enemies and must be policed. Corporate crime takes middle class
consumers as its victims as well as the worker. The rackets peddle
drugs to pacify the lower classes but also touch the children of the
middle classes. Street crime is, for the most part, contained safely
within the inner city but often moves into the placid suburbs. Only
white collar crime is outside the purview of the underground state
apparatus for a peculiarly good reason. Crimes against the corporation
involving its own employees and professional consultants are policed
by a huge private army of secret police. There are almost as many
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private police (810,000) as public police (870,000). One-third of
employees studied report they steal from their corporate employers
(BJS,. 1983): Loss is estimated at tip to 10 billion dollars. The private
securIty police and detectives are used in order to avoid the publicity
and to avoid the criminal justice system. The corporation prefers to
deal with its own employees, with shoplifters and with bad-check
writers on its own terms. It is not profitable to send a bad-check
writer to jail-better to collect the money. And many shoplifters are
middle class children and parents-friends of friends of the country
cl~b .set. And many employees caught converting property or appro-
prlatmg company funds are high level executives. It is not good form
t? call in .t~e police to handle the crimes of friends and family. And the
rigors of jail and prison offend middle-class sensibilities. All in all, the
secr~t policing of crime requires a growing underground state apparatus
but IS deployed largely against lower classes and the under-class.
Underground Structures in the Private Sector
All major corporations have secret policing capacities for commer-
cia~ ~spionage, for bribery of purchasing officers and of government
officials and for checking on its own employees. These structures are
also used to corner markets in unofficial coalitions with other cor-
porations. They are sometimes used to destabilize competitors at home
and abroad. Private and public hospitals, asylums and nursing homes
also have a rich underlife as do prisons, armies, and universities. Each
~ase is. differ.ent t.o be sure and each case needs its own separate analysis
In a grven historical setting. The general point can be made, however,
that underground structures arise in these as in the state sector as
adjusting, adapting, linking mechanisms which subvert publicly given
rule~, programs and social life worlds while maintaining the drama-
turgical appearance that these officially adopted structures are intact.
Underground structures provide a secret and illegitimate resolution of
~he c~ntradicti?nsof the capitalist society-indeed of any social system
I~ which equality and service are the policy but inequality is the prac-
tree.
While this paper has focused on the underground structures of
the ~emocratic state, a more complete political sociology would also
consider the underground structures in the private sector. Donner
(1981) has reported on some of these structures but without a theo-
re~ical or a sociological analysis of them. There are right-wing armies,
prrvate security agencies, a network of think tanks and political action
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groups of a wide variety left out of analysis of politics in democratic
states. I want to emphasize that, by locating repression in underground
structures in the private sector, the democratic state can exculpate
itself from charges of class bias, ethnic or gender discrimination. One
must consider what kind of picture of our national political structures
emerge when we include underground structures of power in both the
public and in the civil sectors. This territory is barely charted.
Now and the Near Future
At present, the chief enemies of the capitalist state are the socialist
liberation groups abroad and the various unorganized groups at home
cut loose from state clientage by the Reagan Administration-and
all other capitalist nations of course. They pose no great problem.
However, two enemies loom on the horizon. As Reagan economic
policy becomes effective, both organized labor and the left-liberal
camp will become threats. Both will have to be the subject of sur-
veillance and destabilization. Workers especially are expected to absorb
the alienation of the capitalist system in crisis by producing more,
by taking lesser wages and fewer benefits, by working in more dan-
gerous conditions, by paying more for food, shelter and transport as
well as by surrendering aspirations for their children. Workers' groups
will have to be watched in secret, for since the Wagner Act of 1935,
union organizing is not illegal.
At the same time, private and corporate crime will increase as
more people are disemployed and excluded from the market place
while more pressure is exerted to dispose of surplus production through
advertising .and .-holiday exhortations in the media. The increase in.
crime-burglary, mugging, auto theft, shoplifting-will give a gloss of
legitimacy for state surveillance on all suspect groups. The growth of
white-collar crime will give industry and commerce a warrant to spy
on its employees, thief and union organizer alike.
In brief, the secret parts of the state expand in time of crisis in
the democratic state organized in a capitalist mode of production and
contract if and when the crisis is, once again, managed. It is very
likely to expand now and in the near future.
Summary and Conclusion
In any inquiry into invasions of privacy, into the illegal use of
surveillance and into the growth of the surreptitious action of the demo-
cratic state, close attention must be paid to the structural features of
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the society in which this activity arises. It is not enough to focus upon
the new electronic technology as clever and as widespread as these may
be-the computer technology, laser technology, television, microwave
and mathematical innovations do, indeed, help the state to do secret
things against its own citizens in contravention of constitutional and
guarantees legal proscriptions. And it is not enough to register the
frequency and variety of such illegal incursions into private life by the
state. A sociology of knowledge and a political sociology require a
structural analysis. It is important to understand how this secret
political activity fits into the whole system.
In this paper, I have set forth the thesis that a democratic and
capitalist state must go underground and do illegal things if it is to
maintain its legitimacy. First, there is the disjuncture between parti-
cipatory relations in the political sphere, on the one hand, and author-
itarian, privilege relations in the private sector, on the other. The
democratic state in capitalist societies resolves this incompatibility
through its underground structures largely in favor of privileged class,
ethnic or gender relations. Then there is the need to guarantee over-
seas markets and materials to the home-based transnational corpora-
tion. In the context of international law and formal agreements within
the capitalist bloc, it is necessary to do secret things against other
capitalist states in order to keep or improve national advantage. Then
too, socialist and nationalist liberation movements must be contained
or the space available for capital growth continues to diminish. Then,
at home, the growth of crime requires the capitalist state to spy on a
great many people while any increase in social movements toward
social justice, equity and equality must be thwarted in secret.
The organization of public political life in the U.S. brings in a
good deal of democratic participation and a good deal of progressive
legislation. It is in the underground structures of the state where the
effects of democracy can be contained and reversed. Demands on the
state in capitalist society have grown apace in the past century. The
capacity of the capitalist system to provide social justice and to provide
for ever increasing private accumulation and concentration of wealth
clash with each other and is limited. In the past ten years, the limits
have been expressed in unemployment, inflation, decline in gross
national product among leading capitalist nations in Europe and the
u.s.
The democratic state has suffered a great loss of legitimacy as
measured by opinion polls regarding confidence in political leaders,
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legislative agencies and administrative agencies. The loss of legitimacy
is also reflected in the rapid swings from right to left and back in the
democratic states of Europe and North America. In other times, war
and depression would renew the economy and renew political legiti-
macy. In this situation, the state must cut its losses, shift responsibility
to local and state agencies, detach powerless clients, drop programs of
social justice and aggressively restrict the public sphere in order to
reconcile class, ethnic, and gender privilege to democratic principles
of equality and equity. The underground structures of the state are
most useful to this reconciliation.
The American public had been taught a kind of child's history of the
world, 'sanitized of the rougher facts of international life. A Victorian
political morality obtained. Presidents, congressional leaders, the
Pentagon, and the State Department all found it convenient to let the
public assume that only the Other Side did things like that. We did
not bribe foreign politicians. We did not undermine other governments.
We did not invade other countries with secret armies. We did not
spread lies, conduct medical experiments, put prisoners in padded
rooms for years on end, build stocks of poison, sabotage factories,
contaminate foodstuffs, pass machine guns to men who planned to
turn them on their national leaders. Above all, we did not plot to kill
men for nothing more than displeasing Washington.
- Thomas Powers
FOOTNOTES
1. It would be tempting to dismiss the USSR as a society which does not conceal
its hostile police capacity vis-a-vis dissidents for much the same reasons as
do the military dictatorship in Chile, Argentina, or Turkey. However, struc-
turally the USSR confronts another problem. The problem in the USSR is
that the relations in the factory, shop, and farm are, in part, organized demo-
cratically, and relations in the state not so organized. Again to reconcile the
structural discontinuity between relations in the democratically organized
productive system and the authoritarian state, a linking system is necessary.
The not-so-secret police resolve this structural contradiction in favor of the
state interests. What little democracy obtains in the economic system is safely
contained and directed toward fulfillment of state norms and centralized plans.
In Poland, the democratic relations have burst the political bindings and are
no longer safely contained in the workplace. Whether this extensive intrusion
into the state sphere is turned back by the forces of the state, or degenerates
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into mere interest group politics or transforms into an authentically socialist
society is the central point of interest for concerned observers. In any case,
one must not make the methodological error of lumping the "socialist" nations
with the authoritarian regimes in the capitalist bloc. The structural features
are very different.
2. See Albert Syzmanski, A General Theory of Civil Liberties (1980), The Red
Feather Institute, for a detailed history of state repression in the U.S. of which
this is a summary.
3. See David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government, Vintage, for a
detailed history of this agency.
4. Apparently, this tactic of "redbaiting" activists for social change cannot be
overdone. Witness Senator Jesse Helms besmirching the character of Martin
Luther King in order to persuade the Senate not to declare King's birthday
a national holiday. Other comments by Helms, directed to the consequence
another holiday could have on worker productivity, reveals the class nature
of his concern.
5. The Israeli state routinely violates international law in secret and then ignores
world opinion. Such opinion is pointless in the face of the success of the
venture. Failures are quickly denied.
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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
THE IMPLICATIONS OF "THEORY Z" FOR
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATION*
Koichi Ezaki
The Pennsylvania State University
William Ouchi's "Theory Z" can be regarded as a link between
sociological theories of organization and empirical studies of organi-
zations. The purpose of this essay is to examine the applicability of
the ideas presented in his book to the sociology of organization. Con-
trary to the popular image, Ouchi's book is not simply about the
applications of Japanese management techniques to American busi-
ness practices. Rather, it concerns basic problems of the sociology
of organization, and the book is full of theoretically interesting
points. By looking into its background and by linking it to previous
theories of organization, we shall be able to find new meaning in it.
In the first section, practical aspects of "Theory Z" are outlined.
In the second section, Theory Z is discussed in relation to McGregor's
Theory X and Theory Y. Through this discussion, it is possible to see
Theory Z in relation to existing organizational theories. In the third
section, Ouchi's empirical studies are discussed. Combining these three
sections, we shall be able to arrive at a fuller picture of the origin
and implications of Theory Z, and its place within the sociological
study of organizations.
PRACTICALITIES OF "THEORY Z;'
Riding a tide of popular interest in Japanese management, Theory
Z by William Ouchi was on the bestseller list through the summer of
1981. What was his motive for writing the book? As Ouchi describes
in the "Acknowledgments," he started by studying Japanese managerial
practices, and then moved to the question of the applicability of
Japanese management techniques. As the force of the Japanese chal-
lenge began to be felt by the general public, he was asked by the
*1 would like to thank Dr. Roland Pellegrin and anonymous reviewers
of MARS for helpful comments in developing this review. An earlier
version of this review was presented as a paper at the North Central
Regional Meeting of ASA on April 28, 1983 at Columbus, Ohio.
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(Ouchi, 1981:Chapter 5)1
In addition to these practical considerations, however, Ouchi's
book is full of theoretically interesting perspectives, especially points
concerning theories of organization. Although Ouchi does not mention
1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as
natural as play or rest. The average human being does not inherently
dislike work. Depending upon controllable conditions, work may be
a source of satisfaction (and will be voluntarily performed) or a source
of punishment (and will be avoided if possible).
2. External control and the threat ofpunishment are not the only
means for bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man
will exercise self-direction and selfcontrol in the service of objectives
to which he is committed.
3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards asso-
ciated with their achievement. The most significant of such rewards,
e.g., the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization needs, can be direct
products of effort directed toward organizational objectives.
4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions,
not only to accept but seek responsibility. Avoidance of responsibility,
FROM THEORIES X AND Y
TO THEORY Z
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McGregor first proposed his theories in the early 1960s. In those
days, much of the work in large factories was designed according to
the principles of scientific management. Although created to solve
problems on the shop floor, such a work design caused different prob-
lems among workers. This was especially true among unskilled and
semi-unskilled workers. Typically, frustrated workers on assembly
lines were affected (Blauner, 1964). Walker and Guest (1952) found
that an average assembly line worker dislikes practically everything
about his job, except good wages and other benefits he receives.
McGregor wanted to improve these conditions by introducing
humanistic views to the management of industrial organizations. He
gave the name Theory X to the assumptions underlying organizations
created in terms of Taylor's scheme. Then, he called newer and more
humanistic assumptions Theory Y. McGregor posited the following
assumptions of Theory Y (Assumptions of Theory X are exactly the
opposite).
the connection explicitly, it is correct to think that Ouchi constructed
his theory with McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y in mind. A brief
review of McGregor's contributions will link Ouchi's work with pre-
vious developments within the sociology of organization.
Understand the Type Z Organization and
Your Role
Audit Your Company's Philosophy
Define the Desired Management Philosophy
and Involve the Company Leader
Implement the Philosophy by Creating Both
Structures and Incentives
Develop Interpersonal Skills
Test Yourself and the System
Involve the Union
Stabilize Employment
Decide on a System for slow Evaluation and
Promotion
Broaden Career Path Development
Preparing for Implementation at the First
Level
Seek Out Areas to Implement Participation
Permit the Development of Wholistic Rela-
tionship
Step One:
Step Four:
Step Two:
Step Three:
Step Five:
Step Six:
Step Seven:
Step Eight:
Step Nine:
Step Twelve:
Step Thirteen:
Step Ten:
Step Eleven:
publisher to "write a book that would not promise simple-minded
solutions but that would deal with the fundamental issues of Japanese
management and American productivity" (Ouchi, 1981 :ix). The
result was Theory Z.
The book is written with a practical purpose in mind. In the
author's own words; "This book addresses the practicalities of apply-
ing an understanding of Japanese management to the American set-
ting (Ouchi, 1981 :ix). In this sense the focus is on American corpora-
tions and not on Japanese management practices per sea This book,
in fact, deals mainly with American corporations which have }apanese-
type management characteristics. These corporations are called "Z
Type" organizations, and the book introduces ideas on how to bring
such features into American businesses. Ouchi describes thirteen steps
by which American companies may be changed to "Z Type."
Mid-American Review of Sociology
lack of ambition, and emphasis on security are generally consequences
of experience, not inherent human characteristics.
5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagina-
tion, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational prob-
lems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.
6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellec-
tual potentialities of the average human being are only partially
utilized.
(McGregor, 1960:47-48)
In addition, McGregor points out an essential implication of
Theory Y: "the limits on human collaboration in the organizational
setting are not limits of human nature but of management's ingenuity
in discovering how to realize the potential represented by its human
resources" (1960:48).
It is likely that McGregor's propositions are acceptable to most
who study industrial relations today. However, the principles dominat-
ing American industry are still closer to the assumptions of Theory
X, not Theory Y. Piore (1982) attempts to explain this fact from the
industrial relations perspective.
The crux of Piore's argument is that, not only management,
but labor unions in the u.s. have built their bargaining power around
the scientific management scheme. His view provides some explana-
tion for the continued predominance of the scheme and recent eco-
nomic developments. According to Piore, the process took place after
the Great Depression, and eventually contributed to the strength of
American industry; He points out that "there is literature going back
to the 1930s arguing that union-organized plants in the United States
were actually more efficient than their nonunion competitors because
unions promoted the best managerial practice" (Piore, 1982:8). How-
ever, the whole industrial structure that supported the system is under-
going a drastic change, due to the changes in the international market
structure and electronics based technological innovation. These are
some of the factors that underlie the problems threatening American
industry and the labor unions that have spurred re-examination of
management-labor relations and it is within this environment that
Ouchi's ideas have taken shape.
Key American industries, such as automobiles, steel, and mac-
hinery, face stiff competition from abroad. Japan, for example, has
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shown remarkable growth in productivity.2 A comparison of Japanese
and American growth industries reveals that .across .the board,. where
fully automated processing is p~ssib~e, U.S. ~ndust~les are takl~g the
lead. On the other hand, Japan IS domg well m semI-automated m~us­
tries. In other words, precisely the fields where, in fact, cooperatlon
between labor and management in production is essential.
Several people have studied and reported good labor and manage-
ment relations among Japanese corporations, especially large corpora-
tions (Vogel, 1975; Abegglen, 1958; Dore, 1973; Cole, 1971,1979).
Stephan Hill (1980:261) has made th~ following .com.ment on the
cause of such good relations: "Large pnvate enterpns~s ~ Japan hav.e
remarkably peaceful industrial relations and a eontributing factor 15
undoubtedly the form of moral cohesion instituted in corporate
paternalism." The term "corporate paternalism" might not a~pl~,t~ all
aspects of Japanese managemen~. How~ver,. "moral cohesion l~ a
characteristic of most Japanese fums. Hiroshi Hazama (1971) ~pph~d
the term "groupism" to such phenomenon, as contrasted Wlth m-
dividualism.
There is no doubt that certain cultural factors are involved in the
different types of industrial relations. However, one way to benefit from
discussions of different types of industrial relations is to look for com-
mon factors among them. In this respect, we can certainly regard
Ouchi's work as one taking such a comparative and cultural approach.
In order to grasp the impact of Theory Z, we m~s~ start from
Ouchi's typology in which he categorizes different existmg manage-
ment types in the United States an~ J apa~. of c~urse, these manage-
ment types are related to underlying industrial relations. .
Ouchi classifies u.s. companies with distinct American manage-
ment traits as Type A, and Japanese companies wi~h distinc~ Japa.nese
management traits as Type J. Inspired b~ what hIS ~onsultmg cll~nts
pointed out in some American companIes,. he designates Amencan
companies with Type J traits as Type Z (OUChl, 198.1 :58)..
In essence he contrasts American companles having Type A
traits with companies having Type Z traits. Type ~ is bureauc~ati~
and mechanistic in nature. This type of company IS based on indi-
vidualismand competition but clogged with aliena~io~ and low pro-
ductivity. Type Z, on the other hand, is more o~gam~ m nature, adap-
tive and cooperative with higher worker satlsfa~tlon and p.roduc-
rivity. Ouchi himself uses the term oTgani~ t.o descnbe Type Z, m con-
trast to the more bureaucratic and mechanistic Type A.
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In order to further our understanding, let us refer to Ouchi's table
contrasting Type J and Type A.
Japanese Organizations vs.
Lifetime Employment
Slow Evaluation and Pro-
motion
Non-Specified Career Paths
Implicit Control Mechanisms
Collective Decision Making
Wholistic Concern
Arnerican Organizations
Short-Term Employment
Rapid Evaluation and Pro-
motion
Specified Career Paths
Explicit Control Mechanisms
Individual Decision Making
Segmented Concern
1. Organizations that appeal to both economic and social
motives will have higher productivity than organizations
that rely exclusively on economic motives.
2. Organizations that use group participation and involvement
in setting goals will have higher productivity than organiza-
tions that do not.
3. Organizations with patterns of frequent upward, downward,
and lateral communication will be more productive than
organizations ~ith predominately downward communication
patterns.
(Ouchi, 1981 :58, Second line added)
Here, we must clarify a few points concerning the table, although
Ouchi refers to these, in part, in his former study (Ouchi and Johnson,
1978:294). Basically, Ouchi sees common traits in Type J and Type Z.
However, "lifetime employment" in Type J would be "long-term
employment" in Type Z, and "collective decision making" would be
"individual decision making." In Japanese corporations, people tend
to work for a firm practically their whole working life. Also, group
decision making is a common practice. We cannot, therefore, com-
pletely equate Type J and Type Z. At any rate, the contrast is still
clear between Type A and Type Z, as are the likenesses between Type]
and Type z. ._:.
,. What is explicit'thro~ghout the book is that, due to the "trust,
subtlety, and intimacy" prevalent in Type Z companies, people are
more satisfied with the work environment. Ouchi calls "trust, subtle-
ty, and intimacy" the three elements of "Z Culture." And because
of increased cooperation between management and workers and among
workers, higher productivity results. The point Ouchi makes here is
critical in judging his work, and this is exactly the point that makes
Theory Z a practical book on management instead of an academic
work. However, what Ouchi described about Z Type organizations
is almost an exact re-statement of propositions made by the Human
Relations School. Below is a summary of typical propositions of
the Human Relations School (Haas and Drabek, 1973:47).
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4. Organizations in which members are psychologically very
close (in which superiors know and understand problems
faced by subordinates) will be more productive than organ-
izations in which members are distant psychologically.
5. Organizations in which decision making is shared widely
throughout the structure with well-integrated linking proc-
esses provided by overlapping groups will he more produc-
tive than organizations in which most decisions are made at
upper levels.
What is pointed out in the first proposition about appealing to
both economic and social motives of the worker applies to the de-
scription of Type Z, while organizations that rely exclusively on eco-
nomic motives applies to Type A. Organizations that use group parti-
cipation and involvement in setting goals will have higher productivity,
the second proposition, applies very well to Type Z, as does the de-
scription about the communication process in the third proposition.
Psychological closeness in the fourth proposition, in essence, is "Z
Culture." The fifth proposition, however, applies to Type J. On the
whole, it is very easy to see close association between the propositions
of the Human Relations Schools and Ouchi's argumenrr' between the
types of organizations that have higher productivity and Ouchi's Type
Z organizations.
It is important to recognize that, before his book appeared, Ouchi
was involved for a number of years in empirical research on Japanese
management in the United States (Johnson, R. and Ouchi, 1974;
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Ouchi and J. Johnson, 1978). It is of interest to find out what the
theoretical background and hypotheses were in these studies. As we
shall see, "Theory Z'" is explicitly based on these studies.
REVIEW OF OUCHI'S
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
As far back as the early 1970s, there were empirical studies of
Japanese management from different points of view. Some were done
from a business perspective, some from sociological and psychological
perspectives. Ouchi took part in two studies which have implications
for Ouchi's theory and sociological theory. .
In collaboration with Richard Johnson, Ouchi worked on an
interview survey in 1974 (Johnson and Ouchi, 1974). Twenty-one
Japanese companies operating 'in the United States were surveyed.
Johnson and Ouchi wanted to discover the factors that contributed
to the success or failure of the Japanese companies. At that time,
Japanese businessmen were trying to make their way into the Ameri-
can market, and Ouchi had not quite developed his theory with par-
ticular application to Japanese management techniques. But Johnson
and Ouchi (1974:62) reported five important aspects of Japanese
managerial practice.
1. Emphasis on a flow of information and initiative from the
bottom up.
2. Making top management the facilitator of decision making
rather than the issuer .of ..edicts.
3. Using middle management as the impetus for, and shaper
of, solutions to problems.
4. Stressing consensus as the way of making decisions.
5. Paying close attention to the personal well-being of em-
ployees.
They also stated that ,the "Japanese approach has some features
that are exportable" (1974:62). In other words, Japanese management
techniques have some characteristics that are common to good human
relations. This point is significant in. two ways. First it means that
Johnson and Ouchi consider them relevant to organizational life in
general. Organizations create certain ways of life, as well as problems
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(Whyte, 1956). In industrial organizations, Human Relations techni-
ques have been developed to help solve some problems, and Johnson
and Ouchi say that aspects of Japanese management techniques also
h elp in this regard.
Second, it has been maintained that industrialized societies tend
to develop common features. This trend is discussed in industrial
sociology as "convergence theory." So-called convergence theorists
argue that industrial societies become more alike than different because
of the common technological factors in the modernization process
(Kerr et aI., 1960; Inkeles and Smith, 1974). However, Johnson and
Ouchi (1974) argue that practices in the u.s. are not "converging"
with practices in other industrial societies, particularly Japan, and
suggest that the absence of convergence with Japanese practices may
create problems for u.s. industry in the future. Simply put, Americans
may be able to learn something about organizational life from the
Japanese. As Johnson and Ouchi (1974:69) state:
It is possible that Japanese methods are more suitable for crowded
organizational life than the Western approach. Obviously, the Ameri-
can system of management, with its emphasis on ingenuity and entre-
preneurial genius, has many strengths. But it rests on the underpin-
nings of a frontier society that exalted individualism and had more
than enough opportunity to go around. In just 50 years, we have
changed from a society in which most people lived on farms to a nation
in which most people live in cities.... The West could accommodate
ten thousand John Waynes spread over the vast landscape. But millions
of John Waynes employed under ten thousand corporate roofs may
not, in the long run, prove workable.
Quchi's second study, published in 1978 in collaboration with
another colleague, pursued the theme of convergence. Ouchi and
Jerry Johnson set out to examine the effect of the urban environment
on the control exercised by work organizations over their members,
and it was during the data gathering process of this study that Ouchi
formulated the typology of Type A, Type J, and Type Z. Despite
the fact that this study of the effects of the environment was aban-
doned, after examining the correlational data between the organiza-
tional types, Type A and Type Z, and the emotional stability of the
employees, Ouchi and Johnson (1978:311) concluded that "Type Z
organization can certainly be said to incorporate some of the more
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humane properties desired by McGregor (1960) and Likert (1961)."
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Theory Z was intended as a practical book on management.
However, this work is related to theories and research in the sociology
of organization, especially the tradition represented by McGregor and
the Human Relations School. When coupled with theoretical develop-
ments and research findings this tradition, Theory Z will probably in-
spire much needed research, particularly in regard to workers' con-
flicting interests with management. In the rapidly changing economic
environment studies concerning types of control excercised over
workers, as exemplified in Type A, Type J, and Type Z organizations,
not only have tremendous social and economic impact but possess
heretofore unrecognized relevance for the further development of
theory in the sociology of organizations.
FOOTNOTES
1. Throughout his book, Ouchi cites cases he obtained through his consulting
work, both successful and unsuccessful in creating "Z Culture." Formation
of a company philosophy is a key development and Ouchi lists examples of
philosophies of Z Type companies including Hewlett-Packard, Dayton-Hudson,
Rockwell International, Intel, and Eli Lilly.
2. If we assign the number 100 to U.S. productivity levels in 1977, Japan is
leading in such fields as transportation machinery (136.1), general machinery
(173.0), electrical machinery (136.1), and steel (210.1). On the other hand,
the U~S. leads in food processing (42.2), clothing (54.7), chemicals (69.7),
and petro-chemicals (77.8) (Labor Ministry of Japan, 1981).
3. However, one thing is different. When the Human Relations School first
developed these propositions, they were conceptual rather than empirical
models. As far as Ouchi's theory is concerned, the organizations presented
as models of Type A and Type J actually exist.
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